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the interests of everyone involved in achieving planning and subsequent program development of our increasing scarce water supplies. Several patterns, or mechanisms, have been suggested and have either been defeated or proved unworkable. The present proposal, in which the President has closely followed the recommendations of the Senate select committee, is the most hopeful yet made.

In order to expedite action on this pressing problem the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Committee on Public Works jointly held hearings last July 28 and August 16 on S. 2246, which was the President's bill. The bill was given a great deal of support from citizens, various organizations and representatives of State governments who were nearly unanimously in favor of the grant program. There was opposition from two or three national organizations, but not to progressive measures.

The Interstate Commission on Water Resources for the Council of State Governments was unable to complete its survey of State views on the measure at the time of the hearing. This work is to be completed in mid-February. The Interior Committee has consequently set a new hearing on February 16 to permit the Interstate Commission to present its final views and recommendations on the bill. If there are others who now wish to be heard on the measure the committee will attempt to hear them at the same time. They should notify the clerk of the committee of their desire to be heard.

It is the desire of the Interior Committee to have all constructive views, criticisms and suggestions in regard to the bill. At the same time, we hope to handle it expeditiously. The chairman of the House Interior Committee has assured me that it will be handled as rapidly as possible by his group.

We will have few bills of greater importance before the Congress in the present session. The increasing threat and pressure of water shortages makes it imperative that we get our house in order to deal wisely and effectively with water problems.

In announcing this early supplemental hearing on S. 2246 on February 16, I want to assure the Senate that every effort will be made in the Interior Committee to get the matter to the floor promptly and help to make the enactment of a Water Resources Planning Act one of the major accomplishments of the Senate and the Congress in the present session.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

#### GREAT BASIN NATIONAL PARK IN NEVADA

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate bill 1760, which I believe is the unfinished business.

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1760) to establish the Great Basin National Park in Nevada, and for other purposes.

#### PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE CONGO

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, before Congress adjourned last September, I took the floor several times to express misgivings about the course of events in the Congo and about our policy or lack of policy in this critically important area of the world.

I was troubled over the dangerous degree of leftist influence in the coalition government which was established at the so-called Louvanium Conference in early August of last year.

I was troubled by the evidence that, while we were footing the bill for the lion's share of the U.N. operation in the Congo, we had very little to say about U.N. policy in the Congo; that this policy was in fact controlled by the Afro-Asian bloc and, in particular, by Nehru's unspeakable Minister of Defense, Krishna Menon, a man who has justly come to be regarded as the personification of cryptocommunism.

I was disturbed, above all, by the U.N. military action of last September, and by the grave implications of this action for the future of the U.N. and for the future of the Western alliance.

Toward the end of last November, as my colleagues know, I visited the Congo, where I had extensive conversations with Prime Minister Adoula, President Tshombe, and members of their respective governments. Since there has been a good deal of misinformation about the purpose of my visit and about what transpired during the course of my visit, I think it might be useful, first of all, to set the record straight.

There have been some reports in the press to the effect that I had gone to the Congo against the opposition of the Department of State; that I had encouraged President Tshombe to hold out for complete independence; and that I had told him that American policy in the Congo was misdirected because there were Communists in the Department of State.

The real truth is that a major part of my purpose in going to the Congo was to try to explore the possibilities of a Tshombe-Adoula agreement in informal discussions with the two leaders.

I left for the Congo on November 21. On Monday morning, November 20, President Kennedy asked me to come to his office. We talked about the Congo situation for almost an hour. The President expressed the hope that I could help to arrange a meeting between Tshombe and Adoula.

I told the President that I would make every effort to bring about such a meeting. And the record shows that I did precisely that.

As a final commentary on the misrepresentations that have appeared in the press, I want to read the text of the letter I received on January 10, from Secretary of State Rusk.

our recent telephone conversation and to your subsequent telegram of January 4, pointing out certain statements made in a newspaper column to the effect that the administration had opposed your recent visit to the Katanga, and that an official of the Department had reported that you had made certain remarks with respect to Communist infiltration in the Department of State to Mr. Tshombe.

I am happy to set the record straight with respect to both of these matters. The administration did not oppose your visit. We feel that your efforts to assist in bringing about the meeting between Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Adoula, which led to the Kitona Agreement, were beneficial. We have found no evidence that a Department official reported that you had discussed with Mr. Tshombe the question of communism in the State Department. Indeed, our Embassy in Leopoldville reports that U.S. representatives who were with you during your conversations state clearly that you did not mention this question.

I hope very much that this letter will clarify the questions that have been raised.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK.

At a later date, I plan to report to my colleagues in greater detail on what I saw and learned in the Congo. As of this moment, I feel that a frank and detailed presentation may have an adverse effect on the delicately poised political situation in the Congo and on the critical discussions which are still going on between the Central Government in Leopoldville and the Government of Katanga.

It is because of this that I have taken the stand that the hearings now proceeding, under the separate auspices of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security and of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Foreign Relations Committee, should be held in executive sessions.

But I believe there are certain aspects of the situation in the Congo which cry out for immediate consideration and understanding. It is to these aspects that I plan to address myself briefly today.

There has been a tendency to justify the U.N. military action against Katanga on the grounds that this action produced the Kitona agreement, that the Kitona agreement has laid the foundation for Congolese unity, that it has undermined the extremists and fortified the moderates in the Central Government.

Gizenga and Gizengalism, we are told, are now dangers of the past.

It is my profound wish that the prospect were really so cheerful and so uncomplicated.

There are, as I see it, four primary dangers in this Pollyanna approach to the Congo crisis.

The first danger is that we will be lulled into a false sense of security concerning the extremist elements in the Leopoldville government.

The action against Gizenga is to be welcomed. But even if Gizenga is eliminated, this will not, by a long shot, terminate the danger of communism in the Congo.

Pro-Soviet extremism in the Congo has always been a many-headed monster; and Gizenga is only one of many